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Abstract. Solutions for an easy and secure setup of a wireless connection be-
tween two devices are urgently needed for WLAN, Wireless USB, Bluetooth and
similar standards for short range wireless communication. All such key exchange
protocols employ data authentication as an unavoidable subtask. As a solution,
we propose an asymptotically optimal protocol family for data authentication that
uses short manually authenticated out-of-band messages. Compared to previous
articles by Vaudenay and Pasini the results of this paper are more general and
based on weaker security assumptions. In addition to providing security proofs
for our protocols, we focus also on implementation details and propose practi-
cally secure and efﬁcient sub-primitives for applications.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the problem of setting up a shared secret key in an ad hoc
manner, that is, in isolation from any key management facility and without pre-shared
secrets. Consider two parties Alice and Bob who want to establish a shared secret key
over an insecure network without any prior authenticated information. If adversaries
are passive, that is, no malicious messages are sent to the network and all messages are
delivered unaltered, then exchanging public keys for Difﬁe-Hellman or similar public
key based key exchange protocol is sufﬁcient. However, an active adversary, Charlie,
can launch an man-in-the-middle attack. Namely, Charlie can replace a desired secure
channel from Alice to Bob by a pair of secure channels, one from Alice to Charlie and
one from Charlie to Bob. The attack is transparent to legitimate users without prior au-
thenticated information. Thus secure key exchange is impossible without authenticated
channels. The main question is how much information,authentic out-of-bandmessages
(OOB messages), must be sent over the authenticated channel to achieve reasonable se-
curitylevel.We areaimingat anapplication,wherekeysareexchangedbetweenvarious
electronic devices and authentic communicationis done by an ordinary user who either
enters messages into devices or compares output displays. The latter severely limits a
plausible size of OOB messages: one could consider 4–6 decimal digits as optimal and
16 hexadecimal characters as an absolute limit. Other possible OOB channels include
various visual or audible signals like blinking lights, images, phone calls etc.
Most urgently such a solution is needed for WLAN: the current use of pre-shared
keys degrades both practical usability and security. The home users should have a clear
and manageable procedure to set up a secure wireless network so that it is easy to add2 Sven Laur and Kaisa Nyberg
and remove devices from the network. Hence, the WiFi Alliance is working on a better
solution.Recently,manualdataauthenticationusingshortauthenticatedstringsreceived
practical applications in ad hoc key agreement. Phil Zimmermann released a software
called Zfone and an Internet draft to offer security to Voice over IP [ZJC06]. A similar
protocol (See Protocol 3) was adopted by USB-IF for Wireless USB devices [WUS06]
and manual data authentication is going to be incorporated into Bluetooth [BT06].
A formal security model for such protocols consists of three bidirectional asyn-
chronouschannels, where messages can be arbitrarily delayed. In-bandcommunication
is routed from Alice to Bob via an active adversary Charlie, who can drop, modify or
insert messages. The out-of-band channel between Alice and Bob is authentic but has
low bandwidth and Charlie can arbitrarily delay3 OOB messages. The model captures
nicely all threats in wireless environment, as malicious adversary with a proper equip-
ment can indeed change the network topologyand thus reroute,drop, insert and modify
messages. However, security is not the only objective. User-friendliness, low resource
consumption and simple setup assumptions are equally important. There should be no
public key infrastructure, as it is almost impossible to guarantee authenticity and avail-
ability of public keys to the humongous number of electronic devices. Also, protocols
should use only symmetric primitives if possible.
All currently known user-aided key exchange and data authentication protocols can
be divided into two differentgroups: protocolswith authenticated but public OOB mes-
sages [Hoe05,CCH06,Vau05,LAN05,PV06a,PV06b,NSS06] and protocols with conﬁ-
dential passwords. Password-protected key exchange, see [BM92,KOY01] and Mana
III in [GMN04], is needed when a user wants to establish a secure connection between
devices that have input only, for example, devices with keyboards but no display. The
main application for the manual data authentication is also a cryptographically secure
but still user-friendly ad hoc key agreement between two or more network devices.
Ourcontribution. Inthispaper,weclarifyandextendourpreliminaryresults[LAN05].
In particular, we show that the previously presented manual cross authentication pro-
tocols [LAN05,PV06b] are indeed instantiations of the same protocol family that uses
a commitment scheme to temporarily hide a secret key needed for data authentication.
Compared to the results by Pasini and Vaudenay [PV06b], our security proofs (Sec. 4)
are more modular and assumptions on used primitives are weaker and geared towards
practice. We explicitly consider implementation details, that is, how to choose practi-
cal primitives (Sec. 5). Given a data authentication protocol it can be combined with
the Difﬁe-Hellman key agreement in a secure way by taking the Difﬁe-Hellman key,
or the pair of the public keys, as the data to be authenticated. But the designers of the
practical protocols from [ZJC06,WUS06] have taken a different approach by using the
Difﬁe-Hellman key shares as the source of randomness. In Sec. 3, we extend our proof
of security also for such a case. In App. A, we consider security in any computational
context and show that, under reasonable assumptions, security is not abruptly degraded
if several protocols are executedin parallel. As an importanttheoretical result, we show
that all asymptotically optimal (unilateral) manual data authentication protocols have a
3 For example, the adversary can distract the user who compares the output of two devices.Efﬁcient Mutual Data Authentication Using Manually Authenticated Strings 3
certain structure (App. B, Theorem 5) and that there are no asymptotically optimal two
round protocols for data authentication (Corollary 1).
2 Cryptographic preliminaries
Our results are formalised in exact security framework where security reductions are
precise and thus reveal quantitative differences between various assumptions. Security
goals are formalised through games between a challenger and a t-time adversary 4 A
who tries to violate some design property.Advantageof A is a non-trivialsuccess prob-
ability Adv
sec(A) in the game sec. The description of sec is omitted when the shape of
Adv
sec(A) reveals the complete structure of sec. We consider asymptotic complexity
only w.r.t. the time-bound t. Let g(t)=O(f(t)) if limsupt→∞ g(t)/f(t) < ∞.I ft h e
working time of adversary can be unbounded, we talk about statistical security.
Letx ←Xdenoteindependentrandomdrawsfromaset X andy ← A(x1,...,x n)
denote assignment according to a randomised algorithm A with inputs x 1,...,x n.
Keyed hash functions. A keyed hash function h : M×K→T has two arguments:
the ﬁrst argument corresponds to a data and the second to a key. In our context an
applicable tag space T is relatively small (may contain as few as 104 elements) and we
need information theoretic properties. A hash function h is εu-almost universal, if for
any two inputs x0  = x1, Pr[k ←K: h(x0,k)=h(x1,k)] ≤ εu and εu-almost XOR
universal if for any x0  = x1 and y, Pr[k ←K: h(x0,k) ⊕ h(x1,k)=y] ≤ εu.
We need a special notion of almost regular functions when the key is divided into
two sub-keys,i.e., h : M×Ka×Kb →T. A hash functionh is (εa,ε b)-almost regular
w.r.t.thesub-keysifforeachdatax ∈M ,tagy ∈Tandsub-keys  ka ∈K , kb ∈K b,we
have Pr[ka ←K a : h(x,ka, kb)=y] ≤ εa and Pr[kb ←K b : h(x, ka,k b)=y] ≤ εb.
In particular, (εa,ε b)-almost regularity implies that the inequalities hold even if y is
drawn from a distribution that is independent from ka and kb. Finally, a hash func-
tion h is εu-almost universal w.r.t. the sub-key ka if for any two data x0  = x1 and
kb, kb ∈K b,w eh a v ePr[ka ←K: h(x0,k a,k b)=h(x1,k a, kb)] ≤ εu. We say that h
is strongly εu-almost universal w.r.t. the sub-key ka if for any (x0,k b)  =( x1, kb),w e
have Pr[ka ←K: h(x0,k a,k b)=h(x1,k a, kb)] ≤ εu. Note that εu,ε a,ε b ≥ 1/|T |
and the word ‘almost’ is skipped in the deﬁnitions if the latter equality holds.
Commitment schemes. A commitment scheme Com is speciﬁed by a triple of algo-
rithms (Gen,Com,Open). A setup algorithmGen generates publicparameterspk of the
commitment scheme. The commitment function Compk : M×R→C×Dtransforms
data m ∈Minto a commitment string c of ﬁxed length and a decommitment value d.
Usually d =( m,r), where r ∈Ris the used randomness. Finally, correctly formed
commitments can be opened, i.e., Openpk(c,d)=m for all (c,d)=Compk(m,r).
Incorrect decommitment values yield to a special abort value ⊥. We often use a short-
hand Compk(m) to denote Compk(m,r) with r ←R . Basic properties of commitment
4 We explicitly assume that adversarial code is executed on a universal Turing or RAM machine.4 Sven Laur and Kaisa Nyberg
schemes are deﬁned by hiding and binding games. A commitment scheme is (t,ε 1)-
hiding if any t-time adversary A achieves advantage
Adv
hid
Com(A)=2·
 



Pr

pk ← Gen,s←{ 0,1},(x0,x 1,σ) ← A(pk)
(cs,d s) ← Compk(xs):A(σ,cs)=s

−
1
2
 



≤ ε1 .
A commitment scheme is (t,ε2)-binding if any t-time adversary A achieves advantage
Adv
bind
Com(A)=P r

pk ← Gen,(c,d0,d 1) ← A(pk):
⊥  = Openpk(c,d0)  = Openpk(c,d1)  = ⊥

≤ ε2 .
Non-malleable commitment schemes. Many notions of non-malleable commitments
have been proposed in cryptographic literature [CIO98,FF00,DG03] starting from the
seminal article [DDN91] by Dolev, Dwork and Naor. All these deﬁnitions try to capture
requirementsthatare necessarytodefeatman-in-the-middleattacks. We adoptthe mod-
ernised version of [CIO98]—non-malleability w.r.t. opening. The deﬁnition is slightly
weaker than the deﬁnition given in [DG03], as we assume that committed messages are
independent from public parameters pk. Such choice allows to deﬁne non-malleability
without a simulator similarly to the framework of non-malleable encryption [BS99].
Intuitively, a commitment scheme is non-malleable, if given a valid commitment
c, it is infeasible to generate related commitments c1,...,c n that can be successfully
opened after seeing a decommitment value d. Formally, an adversary is a quadruple
A =( A1,A 2,A 3,A 4) of efﬁcient algorithms where (A1,A 2,A 3) represents an ac-
tive part of the adversary that creates and afterwards tries to open related commitments
and A4 represents a distinguisher (sometimes referred as a target relation). The adver-
sary succeeds if A4 can distinguish between two environmentsWorld0 (real world) and
World1 (environment where all adversaries are harmless). In both environments, Chal-
lenger computes pk ← Gen and then interacts with adversary A:
1. Challenger sends pk to A1 that outputs a description of an efﬁcient message sam-
pler MGen and a state σ1. Then Challenger draws two independent samples x0 ←
MGen, x1 ← MGen and computes a challenge commitment (c,d) ← Compk(x0).
2. Challenger sends c,σ1 to A2 that computes a state σ2 and a commitment vector
(c1,...,c n) with arbitrary length. If some ci = c then Challenger stops A with ⊥.
3. Challenger sends d,σ2 to A3 that must produce a valid decommitment vector
(d1,...,d n). More precisely, Challenger computes yi = Openpk(ci,d i). If some
yi = ⊥ then Challenger stops A with ⊥.5
4. In World0 Challenger invokes A4(x0,y 1,...,y n,σ 2) with the correct sample x0
whereas in World1 Challenger invokes A4(x1,y 1,...,y n,σ 2) with the sample x1.
5 The latter restriction is necessary, as otherwise A3 can send n bits of information to A4 by
refusing to open some commitments. The same problem has been addressed [DG03] by re-
quiring that behaviour of A4 should not change if yi is replaced with ⊥. The latter is correct
but somewhat cumbersome, as static program analysis of A4 is undecidable in theory. Also, in
a real life protocol a honest party always halts when yi = ⊥ as in our model.Efﬁcient Mutual Data Authentication Using Manually Authenticated Strings 5
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Fig.1. Three round manual authentication protocol
The working time of A is the total time taken to run A1,...,A 4 and MGen. A com-
mitment scheme is (t,ε)-non-malleable iff for any t-time adversary A the advantage of
distinguishing the two worlds is
Adv
nm
Com(A)=|Pr[A4 =0 |World0] − Pr[A4 =0 |World1]|≤ε.
Thedeﬁnitiongivenaboveis naturalin theconcretesecurityframework,as it is con-
ceptually clear and easy to apply. Also, the equivalence result between simulation and
comparisonbased deﬁnition of non-malleableencryption[BS99] can be directly gener-
alised.6 Moreover, the deﬁnition of non-malleable encryption is stronger and therefore
non-malleable encryption schemes (including CCA2 secure encryption schemes) can
be used as non-malleablecommitments providedthat the public parameterspk are gen-
erated by the trusted party. See Sec. 5 for more detailed discussion.
3 Manual data authentication and key exchange protocols
Formal security model. Consider a three round manual cross-authentication protocol
for data (depicted in Fig. 1) where messages α,β,γ are routed via an active adversary
Charlie whocan drop,delay,modifyandinsertmessages. A low bandwidthout-of-band
channel between Alice and Bob is bidirectional and authentic, but Charlie can arbitrar-
ily delay OOB messages. As communication is asynchronous, Charlie can arbitrarily
reorder in-band messages, e.g., Bob can receive  α from Charlie even before Alice has
sent α. Throughout the article, the hatted messages are received from Charlie and sub-
scripts a and b denote values Alice and Bob compute locally.In particular,r a,r b denote
random coins and ma,m b input data of Alice and Bob. The desired common output is
(ma,m b) if both parties reach accepting state.
We assume that Alice and Bob send two OOB messages ooba→b and oobb→a in a
ﬁxed order during the protocol. Additionally, we require that the OOB messages have
been speciﬁed in such a way that either both Alice and Bob accept the output or neither
ofthemdoes.Often,thesecondOOB messagejustindicateswhetherthesenderreached
the accepted state. Charlie succeeds in deception if at the end of the protocol Alice and
Bob reach the accepting state but (ma,  mb)  =( ma,m b). A protocol is correct if Alice
and Bob always reach the accepting state when Charlie does not intervene.
6 Substitutions in the deﬁnitions and proofs of [BS99] are straightforward, except that there is no
decommitment oracle and an isolated sub-adversary A3 has to compute decommitment values.6 Sven Laur and Kaisa Nyberg
Let A be an adversarial algorithm used by Charlie. Then the advantageof A against
data authentication protocol is deﬁned as
Adv
forge(A)= m a x
ma,mb
Pr[Alice and Bob accept (ma,  mb)  =( ma,m b)]
where probability is taken over random coins of A and the honest participants. An
authentication protocol is (t,ε)-secure if for any t-time adversary A, Adv
forge(A) ≤ ε.
We use the same adversarial model for user-aided key exchange protocols. Here, the
number of exchanged messages might be larger than three and the desired common
output consists of a fresh key key and a unique session identiﬁer sid. A key exchange
protocol is (ε,t)-immune against active attacks if, for any t-time adversary A,
Adv
forge(A)=P r[ Alice and Bob accept (sid,keya)  =( sid,keyb)] ≤ ε.
A (ε,t)-immune key exchange protocol is secure when it can resist passive attacks: ε
quantiﬁes the maximal security drop against active compared to passive attacks.
Clearly, the protocol outcome is determined by the ﬁrst OOB message. Moreover,
for the  -bit message there exists an efﬁcient deception strategy that with Adv
forge(A)=
2− .Aprotocolfamilyisasymptoticallyoptimalifitispossibletochoosesub-primitives
so that security level reaches asymptotically 2− , see App. B for further discussion.
Other authors [Vau05,PV06a,PV06b] have used more complex framework [BR93]
to deﬁne security. Such approach is needed only if consecutive runs of authentication
protocols are not statistically independent, i.e., protocols use long-lived authentication
keys. In our case, all protocol runs are statistically independent, i.e., given m a and
mb or sid, a potential adversary can always perfectly simulate all protocol messages.
Therefore, our protocols are secure in any computational context, see App. A.
New protocol families. Our new construction for cross-authentication protocols cov-
ers all currently known asymptotically optimal protocol families: a construction given
by Pasini and Vaudenay [PV06b] and our earlier results [LAN05]. The protocol is de-
picted in Fig. 2. We explicitly assume that all public parameters are generated correctly
by a trusted authority, i.e., we assume the common reference string model. Such as-
sumption is not farfetched, as almost all communicationstandards provide some public
parameters, e.g., descriptions of hash functions.
Protocol
1. Alice computes (c,d) ← Compk(ka) for random ka ←K a and sends (ma,c) to Bob.
2. Bob chooses random kb ←K b and sends (mb,k b) to Alice.
3. Alice sends d to Bob, who computes ka ← Openpk(c,d) and halts if ka = ⊥.
Both parties compute a test value oob = h(ma||mb,k a,k b) from the received messages.
4. Both parties accept (ma,m b) iff the local  -bit test values ooba and oobb coincide.
Speciﬁcation: h is a keyed hash function with sub-keys ka,k b where Ka is a message space
of commitment scheme. The hash function h and the public parameters pk of the commitment
scheme are ﬁxed and distributed by a trusted authority.
Fig.2. Three round cross-authentication protocol Mana IV with  -bit OOB messages.Efﬁcient Mutual Data Authentication Using Manually Authenticated Strings 7
Protocol
1. Alice computes (c,d) ← Compk(ka) for ka = g
a,a← Zq and sends (ida,c) to Bob.
2. Bob computes kb = g
b for random b ← Zq and sends (idb,k b) to Alice.
3. Alice sends d to Bob, who computes ka ← Openpk(c,d) and halts if ka = ⊥.
Both parties compute sid =( ida,idb) and oob = h(sid,k a,k b) from the received messages.
4. Both parties accept key =( g
a)
b =( g
b)
a iff the  -bit test values ooba and oobb coincide.
Speciﬁcation: h is a keyed hash function with sub-keys ka,k b ∈ G where G =  g  is a q
element Decisional Difﬁe-Hellman group; G is a message space of commitment scheme. Public
parameters pk and G are ﬁxed and distributed by a trusted authority. Device identiﬁers ida and
idb must be unique in time, for example, a device address followed by a session counter.
Fig.3. Manually authenticated Difﬁe-Hellman protocol MA–DH with  -bit OOB messages
The Bluetooth authenticationmechanisms are undergoingthe standardisationphase
and the current proposal for the standard [BT06] includes an instantiation of Mana IV
(NUMERIC COMPARISON) among other methods. Our security analysis provides the
necessary theoretical validation (A more detailed discussion is given in Sec. 5).
One can use the Mana IV protocol to authenticate the transcript of the classical
Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange and thus prevent active attacks. Another reasonable al-
ternative, proposed by Zimmermann and Wireless-USB standard group, is to fuse both
protocols into a single one (See Fig. 3). Such solution reduces the number of random
bits and computational complexity. Both are scarce resources in small electronic de-
vices. The MA–DH protocol does not directly correspond to these protocols, as it uses
commitments to hide ga whereas these practical protocols use a cryptographic hash
function H instead and set c = H(ga). As a result our security proofs do not directly
apply for protocols [ZJC06,WUS06]. Still the results give a some insight and provide
suggestions how to achieve provable security (See Sec. 5).
Related work. The protocols by Pasini and Vaudenay [PV06b, Fig. 2 and 4] do not
directly follow the structure of Mana IV, since in their ﬁrst message α = c where
(c,d)=Compk(ma||ra) and ra ←K a. In our security model, we can always assume
that Charlie knows ma,a sma can be hardwired into the adversarial code. Therefore,
if we send α =( ma,c), the security level does not drop and sending ma under the
commitmentbecomesunnecessary.As theauthenticateddatama canbemanykilobytes
long, it also increases the message space for the commitment scheme. The latter can
signiﬁcantly decrease efﬁciency, as all currently known provably secure non-malleable
commitment schemes are based on asymmetric cryptography.
A modiﬁedschemewith (c,d) ← Compk(ra) and α =( ma,c) is a speciﬁc instance
of Mana IV. We also note that in the security proofs of [Vau05,PV06b] it is assumed
that the commitment is either a simulation sound trapdoor commitment scheme or a
hidingone,evenif adversaryis allowedto queryvaluesfornon-challengecommitments
c  = cs. Both of these notions imply non-malleability [MY04], hence our assumptions
areweaker.Moreover,inSec.4,weshowthatnon-malleabilityofCom isalsonecessary,
in a certainsense, tothe securityofthe protocol.Finally,a securefusionof[PV06b] and
Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange similarly to MA–DH becomes problematic (See Sec. 5).8 Sven Laur and Kaisa Nyberg
4 Security analysis of Mana IV and MA–DH protocols
The structure of Mana IV and MA–DH protocols forces adversary, Charlie, to ﬁx data
 ma and  mb beforethe complete hash key (ka,k b) becomespublic. Hence, Charlie must
eitherdirectlyattackthehashfunctionh orsomepropertyofcommitmentschemetoget
extra knowledge about the hash key. A good message authentication code h provides
security against simple substitution attacks and basic propertiesof commitmentscheme
along with non-malleability safeguard against more complex attacks.
Theorem 1 (Statistically binding commitments). For any t, there exists τ = t +
O(1) such that if Com is (τ,ε1)-hiding, ε2-binding and (τ,ε3)-non-malleable and h
is (εa,ε b)-almost regular and εu-almost universal w.r.t. the sub-key ka then the Mana
IV protocol is (2ε1 +2 ε2 + ε3 +m a x {εa,ε b,ε u},t)-secure. If additionally h is also
strongly εu-almost universal w.r.t. the sub-key ka, then the MA–DH protocol is (2ε1 +
2ε2 + ε3 +m a x {εa,ε b,ε u},t)-immune against active attacks.
Theorem 2 (Computationally binding commitments). For any t, there exists τ =
2t+O(1) such that if Com is (τ,ε1)-hiding, (τ,ε2)-binding and (τ,ε3)-non-malleable
and h is (εa,ε b)-almost regular and εu-almost universal w.r.t. the sub-key ka then the
Mana IV protocol is (2ε1+ε2+
√
ε2+ε3+max{εa,ε b,ε u},t)-secure. If additionally
h is also strongly εu-almost universal w.r.t. the sub-key ka, then the MA–DH protocol
is (2ε1 + ε2 +
√
ε2 + ε3 +m a x {εa,ε b,ε u},t)-immune against active attacks.
Proof. For clarity, the proofis split into Lemmata1–5,as all (includingpassive)attacks
can be divided into four disjoint classes. Combining the corresponding upper bounds
on success probabilities proves the claims.    
Theorems 1 and 2 have several noteworthy implications. First, the Mana IV and
MA–DH protocols are indeed asymptotically optimal, see Def. 1 in App. B, as one can
choose h such that max{εa,ε b,ε u} =2 −  and under standard complexity assump-
tions there exist commitment schemes where ε1,ε 2,ε 3 are negligible w.r.t. the security
parameterif allowedworkingtimeτ is polynomial.Secondly,statistically bindingcom-
mitments give better security guarantee than computationallybinding ones: ε 2 vs.
√
ε2.
The latter is caused by the “non-trivial” reduction technique in Lemma 5. Thirdly, the
slight difference in security objectives of Mana IV and MA–DH protocol manifests it-
self as an extra requirement to h. This is quite natural: if ma =  ma,m b =  mb but
(ka, kb)  =(  ka,k b), we get a correct output for Mana IV but incorrect output for MA–
DH, as sida = sidb but keya  = keyb. Finally, if Decisional Difﬁe-Hellman assumption
holds for G, then MA–DH is approximately 2−  secure key exchange protocol.
We give a formal security proof of Mana IV and MA–DH by constructing black
box reductions corresponding to four different attack types. These reductions have the
following structure: given an adversaryA that is good in deception, we construct an ad-
versary A∗ that breaks some propertyof the commitmentscheme. Generic construction
of A∗ is depicted on Fig. 4: in order to win a security game A∗ simulates the original
protocol and communicates with Challenger. As the communication is asynchronous,
A can reorder protocol messages α,β,γ. Let msg1 ≺ msg2 denote that msg1 was out-
put on a communication channel before msg2. As Alice and Bob are honest, temporal
restrictions α ≺  β ≺ γ and  α ≺ β ≺  γ hold for all executions.Efﬁcient Mutual Data Authentication Using Manually Authenticated Strings 9
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Fig.4. Generic reduction scheme
An execution path is almost normal (denoted as norm) if the second round is com-
pleted before A starts the third round, i.e., α,  α,β,  β ≺ γ, γ. Otherwise, one of the
mutually exclusive events γ ≺ β or  γ ≺  β must occur. For brevity, let d-forge denote
that Alice and Bob accept (ma,  mb)  =( ma,m b) in the Mana IV protocol and k-forge
denote that Alice and Bob accept (ida,  idb,keya)  =( ida,idb,keyb) in the MA–DH pro-
tocol. Note that all probabilities in Lemmata 1–5 are taken over random coins of Gen,
A and Alice and Bob and for a ﬁxed input data (ma,m b) or identiﬁers (ida,idb).A s
all proofs are quite straightforward but tedious, only the proof of Lemma 1 covers all
details. All other proofs are more compact: some elementary steps are left to the reader.
Attacks based on almost normal execution paths. In the simplest attack, Charlie
attacks directly h by altering only ma,m b,k b and possibly γ. Charlie’s aim here is to
cleverly choose  kb so that ooba = oobb. An attack where kb  =  kb but other messages
are unaltered can be successful against MA–DH but not against Mana IV. Strong ε u-
universality w.r.t the sub-key ka provides appropriate protection against such attacks.
Lemma 1. For any t, there exists τ = t + O(1) such that if Com is (τ,ε1)-hiding and
(τ,ε2)-binding and h is εu-almost universal w.r.t. the sub-key ka, then for any t-time
adversary A and input data (ma,m b)
Pr[d-forge ∧ norm ∧ c =  c] ≤ εu · Pr[norm ∧ c =  c]+ε1 + ε2 . (1)
If additionally h is strongly εu-almost universal w.r.t. the sub-key ka, then for any pair
of identiﬁers (ida,idb)
Pr[k-forge ∧ norm ∧ c =  c] ≤ εu · Pr[norm ∧ c =  c]+ε1 + ε2 . (2)
Proof. ANALYSIS OF MANA IV. Assume a t-time algorithm A violates (1). Then
Pr[d-forge ∧ norm ∧ c =  c ∧ ka =  ka] ≥ Pr[d-forge ∧ norm ∧ c =  c] − ε2, or other-
wise Alice and A together can open the commitment c to two different values k a  =  ka
with probability more than ε2. The latter contradicts (τ,ε2)-binding for τ = t + O(1).
Next, we construct A∗ that wins the hiding game, i.e., given pk outputs (x0,x 1,σ)
and afterwards given a commitment cs for s ←{ 0,1}, can correctly guess the bit s.
The adversary A∗ acts in the following way:
1. Given pk, chooses ka,k∗
a ←K a as (x0,x 1) and sends (ka,k∗
a,pk) to Challenger.10 Sven Laur and Kaisa Nyberg
2. When Challenger replies cs for (cs,d s)=Compk(xs), A∗ simulates a faithful
executionof Mana IV with α =( ma,c s) until A queriesγ. A∗ stops the simulation
and halts with ⊥, if there is a protocol failure, ¬norm or c  =  c.
3. If h(ma|| mb,k a, kb)=h( ma||mb,k a,k b) and (ma,  mb)  =(  ma,m b) outputs a
guess s =0 , else outputs a guess s =1 .
Now, consider when the simulation diverges from the real run of Mana IV with the
same randomness ra and rb.I fs =0then (c0,d 0)=Compk(ka) and Step 3 does not
reﬂect the protocoloutcome in three disjoint cases: (a) abnormalexecutionor c  =  c, (b)
 γ is not a valid decommitment (d-forge does not happen) and (c) ka  =  ka. Therefore,
we get Pr[A∗ =0 |s =0 ]≥ Pr[d-forge ∧ norm ∧ c =  c ∧ ka =  ka ].F o rs =1 ,w e
get Pr[A∗  = ⊥|s =1 ]=P r[ norm ∧ c =  c], as simulation is perfect until A queries γ.
Since c1 and ka are statistically independent,all values computedby A are independent
from ka and thus Pr[A∗ =0 |s =1 ,A ∗  = ⊥] ≤ εu. We arrive at a contradiction, as
these bounds imply Adv
hid(A∗)=|Pr[A∗ =0 |s =0 ]−Pr[A∗ =0 |s =1 ]| >ε 1 and
A∗ runs in time t + O(1).
ANALYSIS OF MA–DH. Lets update only the forgery test in the last step of A∗:
3. If h(ida|| idb,k a, kb)=h( ida||idb,k a,k b) and (ida,  idb, kb)  =(  ida,idb,k b) output
a guess s =0 , else output a guess s =1 .
Similarly to Mana IV, Pr[A∗ =0 |s =0 ] ≥ Pr[k-forge ∧ norm ∧ c =  c ∧ ka =  ka ]
and Pr[A∗  = ⊥|s =1 ]=P r[ norm ∧ c =  c], since the remaining code of A∗ is iden-
tical. The new forgery test forces a restriction (x0,k b)  =( x1, kb) instead of x0  = x1
and we need strongly εu-universal h to bound Pr[A∗ =0 |s =1 ,A ∗  = ⊥] ≤ εu.    
Note 1. Strong εu-universality is necessary for the security of the MA–DH protocol,
see Sec. 5 for a concrete counter example.
Anotheralternativeis a directattackagainstnon-malleabilitywhereA tries to create
“cleverly” related sub-keys ka and  ka to bypass the security check.
Lemma 2. For any t, there exists τ = t + O(1) such that if Com is (τ,ε3)-non-
malleable and h is (εa,ε b)-almost regular, then for any t-time adversary A and inputs
(ma,m b) or session identiﬁer (ida,idb)
Pr[d-forge ∧ norm ∧ c  =  c] ≤ εa · Pr[norm ∧ c  =  c]+ε3 , (3)
Pr[k-forge ∧ norm ∧ c  =  c] ≤ εa · Pr[norm ∧ c  =  c]+ε3 . (4)
Proof. Let A be a t-time algorithm that violates (3). Then we can build an adversary
A∗ =( A∗
1,A ∗
2,A ∗
3,A ∗
4) that can break non-malleability of the commitment scheme:
1. Given pk, A∗
1 outputs a uniform sampler over Ka and a state σ1 =( pk,m a,m b).
Challenger computes x0,x 1 ←K a and (c,d) ← Compk(x0).
2. Given c,σ1, A∗
2 simulates the protocol with kb ←K b and stops before A demands
γ. A∗ stops the simulation and halts with ⊥, if there is a protocol failure, ¬norm or
c =  c. Otherwise, A∗
2 outputs a commitment  c and σ2 containing enough informa-
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3. Given d,σ2, A∗
3 resumes the simulation and outputs  d as a decommitment value.
4. If A∗
3 was successful inopening c thenA∗
4(xs,y,σ 2) sets ka ← xs and  ka ← y and
computes ooba = h(ma|| mb,k a, kb) and oobb = h( ma||mb, ka,k b).I fooba =
oobb but (ma,  mb)  =( ma,m b), then A∗
4 outputs a guess s =0 , else outputs 1.
Again, consider where the simulation can diverge from the real execution of Mana
IV. In both worlds, we can have a discrepancy if execution is abnormal or c =  c.I n
World0, Step 4 provides a perfect simulation whereas in World1 ka is independent of
all variables computed by A. Therefore, using same methodology as before
Pr[A∗
4 =0 |World0]=P r[ d-forge ∧ norm ∧ c  =  c] ,
Pr[A
∗
4 =0 |World1] ≤ εa · Pr[norm ∧ c  =  c],
as h is (εa,ε b)-almost regular. A contradiction as Adv
nm(A∗) >ε 3. For the MA–DH
protocol, we have to reﬁne the forgery test in Step 4 similarly to the proof of Lemma 1,
but otherwise the analysis is exactly the same.    
Note 2. Obviously, non-malleability w.r.t. every target relation is not necessary. In par-
ticular, if h is ﬁxed then it is necessary and sufﬁcient that Com is secure for all adver-
saries having the same structure as in Lemma 2. The latter requirement is weaker than
complete non-malleability, however, one has to reconsider the condition if h is substi-
tuted with a different function and technically such condition is not easier to prove.
Attacks based on abnormal execution paths. The remaining two attack patterns are
easy to analyse, since they are direct attacks against binding and hiding properties. If
 γ ≺  β then successful A can predict ka given only c and thus win the hiding game.
Lemma 3. For any t there exists τ = t + O(1) such that if Com is (τ,ε1)-hiding, h is
(εa,ε b)-almost regular.Then for any t-time adversary A and input (ma,m b) or session
identiﬁer (ida,idb)
Pr[d-forge ∧  γ ≺  β ] ≤ ε1 + εa · Pr[ γ ≺  β ] , (5)
Pr[k-forge ∧  γ ≺  β ] ≤ ε1 + εa · Pr[ γ ≺  β ] . (6)
Proof. Let A be a t-time adversary that violates (5). If  γ ≺  β, the Bob’s control value
oobb is ﬁxed before A receives γ. Consider A∗ that plays the hiding game:
1. Given pk, chooses ka,k∗
a ←K a as (x0,x 1) and sends (ka,k∗
a,pk) to Challenger.
2. When Challenger replies cs for (cs,d s)=Compk(xs), A∗ simulates a faithful
executionofManaIV with α =( ma,c s) untilA outputs  β. A∗ stops thesimulation
and halts with ⊥, if there is a protocol failure,  γ ⊀  β or Openpk( c,  d)=⊥.
3. Next A∗ computes  ka = Openpk( c,  d), ooba = h(ma|| mb,k a, kb) and oobb =
h( ma||mb, ka,k b).I fooba = oobb and (ma,  mb)  =( ma,m b) outputs 0, else 1.
Again, consider where the simulation can diverge from the real protocol. If s =0then
only  γ ⊀  β can cause the difference. For s =1 , simulation is perfect until γ is queried12 Sven Laur and Kaisa Nyberg
and thus Pr[A∗  = ⊥|s =1 ]=P r[  γ ≺  β].A ska is independent from oobb,  mb and
 kb, then Pr[A∗ =0 |s =1 ,A ∗  = ⊥] ≤ εa follows from (εa,ε b)-almost regularity. A
contradiction, as Adv
hid(A∗) > Pr[d-forge ∧  γ ≺  β ] − εa · Pr[ γ ≺  β] >ε 1. Same
algorithm with a redeﬁned forgery check is suitable for the MA–DH protocol.    
To win the remaining case γ ≺ β, adversary A must double open  c to succeed. For
statistically binding commitments, the reduction is simple. Analysis of computational
binding commitments is more complex.
Lemma 4. If Com is statistically ε2-binding and h is (εa,ε b)-almost regular, then for
any adversary A and input (ma,m b) or session identiﬁer (ida,idb)
Pr[d-forge ∧ γ ≺ β] ≤ ε2 + εb · Pr[γ ≺ β] , (7)
Pr[k-forge ∧ γ ≺ β] ≤ ε2 + εb · Pr[γ ≺ β] . (8)
Proof. For each commitment  c, ﬁx a canonical  ka such that  ka = Openpk( c,  d0) for
some  d0.I fγ ≺ β then ooba is ﬁxed before kb. Now, the probability that different
kb values lead to different valid openings  k 
a  =  ka is at most ε2. Otherwise, one can
ﬁnd valid double openings Openpk( c,  d0)  = Openpk( c,  d1) just by enumerating all
possible protocol runs. Now Pr[kb ←K: ooba = h( ma||mb, ka,k b)] ≤ εb,a skb is
independent form  ka and ooba and thus both claims follow.    
Lemma 5. For any t there exists τ =2 t+O(1) such that if Com is (τ,ε2)-bindingand
h is (εa,ε b)-almost regular, then for any t-time adversary A and inputs (ma,m b)
Pr[d-forge ∧ γ ≺ β] ≤ εb · Pr[γ ≺ β]+
√
ε2 , (9)
Pr[k-forge ∧ γ ≺ β] ≤ εb · Pr[γ ≺ β]+
√
ε2 . (10)
Proof. Let A be a t-time adversary that violates (9). Consider A∗ that
1. Simulates protocol run until A queries β and stores  c. Halts if γ ⊀ β.
2. Provides k0
b,k1
b ←K b and outputs  c with the corresponding replies  d0 and  d1.
For a ﬁxed pk and c, let εpk,b c =P r[ d-forge|γ ≺ β,pk, c] denotethe forgeryprobability
w.r.t. a single challenge kb at Step 2 and
δpk,b c =P r[ ⊥  = Openpk( c,  d0)  = Openpk( c,  d1)  = ⊥|γ ≺ β,pk, c]
the success probability at Step 2. Then δpk,b c ≥ εpk,b c(εpk,b c − εb), since h is (εa,ε b)-
almost regular and oob
0
b is ﬁxed before k1
b. Using a special case of Jensen’s inequality,
E(X2) ≥ E(X)2 for any distribution of X, we get
Pr[success|γ ≺ β]=

pk,b c
Pr[pk = Gen, c|γ ≺ β](ε2
pk,b c − εbεpk,b c)
≥ Pr[d-forge|γ ≺ β]
2 − εb Pr[d-forge|γ ≺ β] .
As Pr[d-forge|γ ≺ β] >ε b,w eg e tPr[success|γ ≺ β] ≥ (Pr[d-forge|γ ≺ β] − εb)2.
Now from Pr[γ ≺ β] ≥ Pr[γ ≺ β]
2, we obtain a contradiction
Adv
bind(A
∗) ≥ Pr[γ ≺ β]
2 (Pr[d-forge|γ ≺ β] − εb)
2 >ε 2 .
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Note 3. There are several alternatives to Lemma 5 that offer various tradeoffs between
time τ and ε2 depending how many times A is probed with different values of k b.A sA
maytotallybreaktheManaIVprotocolonε2 fractionpublicparameterspkanddonoth-
ing for other values of pk, we cannot get a better bound than Pr[d-forge ∧ γ ≺ β] ≤
εb · Pr[γ ≺ β]+ε2 with black-box reductions. In our earlier work [LAN05], we used
knowledge extraction techniques to obtain more complex reductions.
Note 4. Compared to proofs in [Vau05,PV06b] Lemma 5 seems to be inefﬁcient and
cumbersome. However, Vaudenay et al uses a different notion of binding—de facto
they postulate Lemma 5 for a certain h as a security requirement. In asymptotic sense
these notions are equivalent (there are polynomial reduction between them), but the
exact security framework reveals that their condition is quantitatively much stronger.
In practical applications, commitments are constructed from cryptographic hash
functions like SHA-1 and classical binding is more appropriate notion, since it leads
directly to collision resistance. Secondly, Vaudenay’s approach does not generalise for
more complex constructions of h.
5 Practical Implementation Details
Securityconstraints. ManaIVandMA–DHprotocolsare securein anycomputational
context if (a) random values are never reused, (b) protocol outputs are never used be-
fore reaching the accepting state, (c) there are no multiple protocol instances between
the same device pair at any time. Then a single protocol instance has same security
guarantees as in Theorems 1 and 2. See App. A for a formal proof and discussion.
Hash functions. To instantiate Mana IV and MA–DH protocols, we need hash func-
tions h : M×K a ×K b →{ 0,1}  that are (εa,ε b)-almost regular and (strongly) εu-
almost universal w.r.t. the sub-key ka. In our preliminary work [LAN05], we proposed
a construction h(m,ka,k b)=h0(m,f(ka,k b)) where h0 is a εu-almost universal and
εa-regular and f : Ka ×K b →{ 0,1}m is regular w.r.t. sub-keys ka,k b and for any
kb  =  kb the distribution of pairs (f(ka,k b),f(ka, kb)) for ka ←K a is statistically
δ-close to uniform distribution. Then it is straightforward to verify that h is (ε a,ε a)-
almost regular and max{εa +δ,εu}-almost universal, since for kb  =  kb keys f(ka,k b)
are f(ka, kb) almost independent.
Asaconcreteexampleletf : {0,1}2m×{0,1}2m →{ 0,1}m bedeﬁnedasfollows:
f(x0||x1,y)=x0y ⊕ x1 in GF(2m) if x0  =0and f(0m||x1,y)=x1 ⊕ y otherwise.
Clearly, f is regularw.r.t. the sub-keysand f(x0,x 1,y 1)⊕f(x0,x 1,y 2)=x0(y1⊕y2)
covers GF(2m) \{ 0} when y1  = y2 and x0  =0 . Hence, f is (εa,ε a)-almost regular
and max{2−m+1 + εa,ε u}-secure. Note that for proper choice of m, 2−m+1   2− .
Pasiniet al.,[PV06b]proposeda constructionh(m,ka,k b)=h0(m,ka)⊕kb where
h0 is εu-almost XOR universal and εa-almost regular w.r.t. ka. The latter is (εa,2− )-
almost regular and strongly εu-almost universal. But such construction cannot be used
in the MA–DH protocol, as kb is typically at least 200 bits long. If we compress kb in
somemanner,i.e.,computeh(ma||mb,k a,k b)=h0(ma||mb,k a)⊕h1(mb,k b) thenthe
resulting hash function is only εu-almost universal. A malicious adversary can choose14 Sven Laur and Kaisa Nyberg
(mb,k b)  =( mb, kb) such that h1(mb,k b)=h1(mb, kb). Since   is small in practical
protocols, such pair can be found in real time and Charlie can indeed break the MA–
DH protocol by choosing  kb = gc for c ← Zq in this way. As a result Charlie and
Alice share a common key. If Bob is a wireless router, then Charlie has successfully
completed the attack, as he can transfer Alice’s communication to Bob using secure
channelbetweenhimselfandBob.Hence,theproperchoiceofhis extremelyimportant.
For practical purposes M = {0,1}512 is sufﬁciently big, as one can always use a
collisionresistanthashfunctionstocompresslongermessages.Andforsuchparameters
many efﬁcient εu-almost (XOR) universal and perfect hash functions are known with
εu ≤ 2− +1 (See [Sti91,BJKS93,NGR05] for some concrete examples).
Some practical proposals [BT06, p. 13, 21] propose use cryptographic hash func-
tionstoconstructh.Thelatterisaplausiblethoughheuristicchoice,aslongasstatistical
tests do not reveala signiﬁcant deviationfrom desired parametersεa,ε b,ε u. Otherwise,
the potential adversary can discover and exploit these weaknesses.
Non-malleable commitment schemes. The simplest construction of a non-malleable
commitment scheme is based on a CCA2 secure encryption scheme. Let Encpk : M×
R→Cbe a deterministic encryption rule where r ∈Rdenotes randomness used to
encrypta message. Deﬁne (c,d) ← Compk(x,r) as c = Encpk(x,r) and d =( x,r) and
Openpk(c,d)=m if Encpk(x,r)=c and ⊥ otherwise. Then the corresponding com-
mitment scheme is non-malleable provided that pk is generated by a trusted party. We
suggestCramer-ShouporDesmedt-Kurosawaencryptionschemes[CS98,KD04],asthe
public key is a random tuple of group elements and can be easily generated without the
secret key. RSA-OAEP is also CCA2 secure in a random oracle model [FOPS01]. Nev-
ertheless, the key pk must be securely distributed, since a priori non-malleability w.r.t.
pk does not guarantee non-malleability w.r.t. related keys pk1 and pk2.
All these constructions are too inefﬁcient for small electronic devices and they offer
too high levels of security. Recall that     14 and thus a commitment scheme should
be roughly (280,2−20)-non-malleable. Secure distribution of pk is another problem. In
principle, it can be managed as there is only single public key, but may still not be
well accepted for industrial applications. There are commitment schemes that are non-
malleable without commonly shared pk, but these are very inefﬁcient in practice.
In reality, a cryptographic hash functions like SHA-1 are used instead of commit-
ments, as such constructions are hundred times faster and there are no setup assump-
tions. Let H be a collision resistant hash function. Then the hash commitment is com-
puted as (c,d) ← Com(x,r) with c = H(x||r) and d =( x,r) or, as in HMAC,
c = H(r ⊕ opad||H(r ⊕ ipad||x)) with d = r (See [BT06, p. 13] as an exam-
ple). Both constructions are a priori not hiding. We would like to have a provably
secure construction. In theory, we could use one-wayness of H and deﬁne commit-
ment with hard-core bits but this leads to large commitments. Instead, we use Bellare-
Rogaway random oracle design principle to heuristically argue that a hash commitment
based on the OAEP padding is a better alternative. Recall that the OAEP padding is
c = H(s,t),s =( x||0k0) ⊕ g(r),t = r ⊕ f(s). The corresponding commitment c
along with d = r is provably hiding and binding if g is pseudorandom, f is random
oracle, and H is collision resistant. A priori SHA-1 and SHA-512 are not known toEfﬁcient Mutual Data Authentication Using Manually Authenticated Strings 15
be non-malleable, as it has never been a design goal. On the other hand, the security
proof of OAEP [FOPS01] shows CCA2 security (non-malleability) provided that H is
a partial-domain one-way permutation.More speciﬁcally, it should be infeasible to ﬁnd
s givenh(s,t),s←M 1,t←M 2. The partial one-waynessfollows forr,t ∈{ 0,1}80
if we assume that H is at least (2160,2−20)-collision resistant as we can enumerate all
possible t values to get a collision. The other assumption that h is a permutation is im-
portantin the proof.Therefore,we can onlyconjecturethat the proofcan be generalised
and the OAEP padding provides a non-malleable commitment scheme.
Hence, an important theoretical task is to provide efﬁcient but provably hiding
and non-malleable but efﬁcient padding construction for hash commitments. Also, one
could reprove Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 without assuming hiding from Com, as in both
proofs we do not need hiding of ka but just Charlie’s inability to control Alice’s ooba.
Practical implementations [ZJC06,WUS06] of the MA–DH protocol use c = H(g a)
and such a relaxed security proof would bridge the gap between theory and practice.
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A Security in arbitrary computational context
Assume that Mana IV and MA–DH protocols are run so that the security constraints
presented in Sec. 5 are fullﬁlled. Then a protocol instance is uniquely determined by
the time, origin and destination of the OOB message and a potential adversary cannotEfﬁcient Mutual Data Authentication Using Manually Authenticated Strings 17
interleave OOB messages. This restriction can be trivially fullﬁlled—there is no need
to exchange more than one key at a time and multiple messages can be sent together.
Consider ideal implementations of cross-authenticationand Difﬁe-Hellman key ex-
change protocols. In ideal world, given ma and mb adversary can either deliver them to
Alice and Bob or drop messages. Similarly, given ga, gb and sid, adversary can either
do a passive attack against the key exchange protocol or interrupt it. Now consider a
security game sec that deﬁnes security of a complex protocol.Next, theoremshows that
the security drop compared to the ideal implementation is at most ε.
Theorem 3. Let tp be the total computational time needed to complete a complex pro-
tocol Π. For any t-time adversary A such that Adv
sec
real(A)=δ in the real protocol,
there exists a (t + tp)-time adversary A∗ that achieves Adv
sec
ideal(A∗) ≥ δ − ε, if used
Mana IV or MA–DH protocol is at least (t + tp + O(1),ε)-secure.
Proof (Sketch). Since the source and destination of OOB messages together with the
time uniquely reveal the corresponding Mana IV or MA–DH instance, it is straightfor-
ward to verify that honest Alice and Bob accept ma|| mb  =  ma||mb or (sida,keya)  =
(sidb,keyb) with probability at most ε. Otherwise, we can simulate the surrounding
computational context and break a stand-alone Mana IV or MA–DH protocol instance
withlargerprobabilitythanε.Ofcourse,theprecedinghistorythatdetermines(m a,m b)
or sid should be ﬁxed in such attack. As all previously used random coins can be hard-
wired, the corresponding attack still takes t + tp + O(1) steps.
Now consider an adversary A∗ that tries to win the game sec in the ideal world. It
simulates a real protocol run to the adversary A. Essentially, A∗ provides A a direct
access to the ideal world except for the absent Mana IV or MA–DH protocol instance.
Given (ma,m b) or (ida,ga,idb,gb), A∗ simulates the corresponding protocol to A.
If A succeeds in deception, then A∗ halts. Otherwise it simulates the end result of the
protocolin the ideal world,i.e., delivers all messages unalteredor dropsthem. Note that
when A∗ does not halt then there is no discrepancy between the ideal and real protocol
run. Since Pr[A∗ halts] ≤ ε due to the ﬁrst part of the proof, the result follows.    
Note 5. If many protocol instances can be run in parallel between the same device pair,
then there are no security guarantees. When more than 2  protocols run in parallel, then
Charlie can certainly swap OOB messages so that at least one attacked protocolreaches
accepting state. Of course, such attack is not practical.
B Theoretical limitations
In the following, we show that there are no asymptotically optimal two round manual
message authentication protocols. In other words, two round protocols are inherently
less secure. However, the exact quantiﬁcation of such security drop is out of our scope.
Here it is advantageous to consider unilateral authentication protocols since uni-
lateral authentication is a special case of cross authentication. In a manual unilateral
authentication protocol Sender wants to transfer a authentic message m to Receiver.
The restrictions to the protocols are same: protocol must be correct, the order of all18 Sven Laur and Kaisa Nyberg
messages is ﬁxed ahead and the ﬁrst OOB message oob determines the protocol out-
come. Let   the maximal length of oob. We explicitly assume that   ≤ 30, since for
sufﬁciently large   (say 160 bits) one can use collision resistant hash functions to pro-
tect authenticity, e.g., send oob = h(m). We also assume that the length of inputs m is
larger than   or otherwise we can send m as the ﬁrst OOB message. Note that a simple
collision attack where Charlie interacts honestly but uses 2 +1 pre-tabulated values for
input and randomness gives a formal proof to the “folklore” bound.
Theorem 4. Let π be a correct unilateral authentication protocol with ﬁxed message
order and let   be the maximal length of the ﬁrst out-of-bandmessage. Then there exists
a strategy A such that Adv
forge
π (A) ≥ 2− .
Proof. The proof is omitted due to the lack of space. The complete proof is given in the
extended version of the current article [LN06].    
Suchstrategyis feasibletofollowinreal-timefor  ≤ 30,asnecessarypre-tabulated
valuescanbehardwiredintothe codeofA andthenthe computationalresourcesneeded
to construct the actual program code are irrelevant.
Next we show that no two round protocols can achieve security bounds arbitrarily
close to 2− . A practical protocol must be secure against the attacks that take super-
linear time w.r.t. the honest protocol run or otherwise the security margin is too small.
Deﬁnition 1. We say that a protocol family {πk} with a ﬁxed message ordering is
asymptotically optimal when the maximal advantage εk with respect to the time-bound
tk approaches εk → 2−  and tk is at least super-linear in the protocol complexity.
In principle, unilateral authentication protocols can have arbitrary structure. If we
assume asymptotic optimality from the protocol family, then we can show that for large
enough k, oob(m,rr,r s) is almost uniform w.r.t. to Receiver’s randomness rr and
Sender’s randomness rs, and with high probability only a single value oob(m,rr,r s)
leads to acceptance. Formally, we need a concept of uniform convergenceto state these
properties. A parametrised sequence xk(a) converges uniformly xk(a) ⇒ x with re-
spect to the parameter a ∈{ 0,1}∗,i flim
k
sup
a
xk(a) = lim
k
inf
a xk(a)=x.
Theorem 5. Let {πk} be an asymptotically optimal and correct protocol family, let
probability Pr[·|πk] be taken over honest runs of πk and let two-oob denote the event
that more than one value of oob lead to acceptance. Then next statements are true:
(a) Pr[oob|m,rs,π k] ⇒ 2−  w.r.t. the parameters m,rs,
(b) Pr[two-oob|m,πk] ⇒ 0 w.r.t. the parameter m,
(c) Pr[oob|rr,m,π k] ⇒ 2−  w.r.t. the parameters rr and m.
Proof. Follows from an extended analysis of the collision attack, see [LN06].    
Corollary 1. There are no asymptotically optimal and correct two round protocol fam-
ilies with a ﬁxed message order for unilateral authentication.
Proof. Omitted, see the extended version of [LN06].    
The stated result is rather weak, since it does not quantify how close to the optimal
bound the deception probability of two round protocols can go. More accurate analysis
is still an open question.